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THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AUDIT FEES
Cindy K. Harris, Ursinus College

ABSTRACT
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) established not only corporate governance reform but also legislated
significant changes to the practice of auditing publicly held corporations. Rules implemented by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) further reinforced stronger corporate governance standards. The effect of these
reforms on the cost of public audits is indisputable: the initial rise in audit fees was dramatic as corporations
complied with the new provisions. This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance
characteristics and audit fees for a random sample of 100 publicly traded corporations drawn from the 2005 Fortune
500 list. The data is obtained from SEC proxy statements and annual report filings for the 2005 fiscal year. The
study examines characteristics of the audit committee and board of directors, while controlling for several financial
measures generally associated with higher audit fees. The corporate governance attributes include two measures of
expertise (the number of audit committee financial experts and the average number of outside directorships held by
board members) and two measures of diligence (meeting frequency of audit committee and board of directors). The
results indicate a positive, significant relationship between both measures of expertise and audit fees. In addition,
greater frequency of board of directors meetings is also significantly related to higher audit fees, while audit meeting
frequency is not. This outcome suggests that higher quality corporate governance as measured by fiduciaries’
expertise and board diligence is associated with higher audit costs.

INTRODUCTION
The role of corporate governance has
increased in magnitude since the passage of Sarbanes
Oxley in 2002 (“SOX”) and new regulatory
requirements of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”). The legislated changes to the
composition and expanded role of both the boards of
directors of public companies and their audit
committees stem from the “series of corporate
scandals that raised concerns over the effectiveness
of existing corporate governance standards” (White
& Case). The goals of the new rules are to enhance
transparency, accountability and objectivity in the
oversight by boards of directors and board
committees. The hope is that achievement of these
accountability goals will promote increased investor
confidence in the financial markets for public
companies’ securities.
SOX mandated that the SEC issue rules to
implement expanded disclosures about the internal
controls of public companies. Corporations subject to
the expansive reporting and attestation provisions of
Section 404 of SOX have as a consequence
experienced skyrocketing audit fees. In addition,
SOX has clearly set up a different environment in
which boards operate. It has made board meetings
more compliance-focused than in the past, requiring
directors to delve “deeper than ever before into what
it takes to fulfill their role as fiduciaries.

Expectations of the board continue to grow and
evolve, with the added pressure that directors must
increasingly focus on their potential liabilities”
(Eckbo, 2006). Likewise, the role and practices of the
audit committee are experiencing a shift. Increased
time and effort is now required of audit committee
members to communicate with key organization
personnel, monitor the internal audit function,
oversee conflicts of interest, and ensure auditor
independence (Lipman, 2006).
Debate persists about whether the dramatic
rise in audit fees is a onetime increase in the costs of
compliance with Section 404 or whether there has
been a permanent shift as a consequence of SOX that
will create an ongoing environment of higher audit
fees.
In this study, I examine the relation between
corporate governance and audit fees for Fortune 500
companies since the implementation of SOX,
including its Section 404. All of the companies
comprising the sample engaged a Big 4 auditor, so
that there is no difference in the level of audit quality
provided by the external auditors. The purpose of the
study is to discern to what extent audit fees in the
post-SOX environment can be linked to measures of
both board and audit committee expertise and
diligence. Prior research supports the notion that a
board that is more diligent and expert “may demand
differentially higher audit quality (which requires

more audit work)” than would normally be demanded
in order to protect the board’s self interest. (Carcello,
2002)
The number of board meetings that occurred
during the year is used as a proxy for board diligence.
Board expertise is measured using the average
number of other director positions held by a
company’s board of directors. Audit Committee
expertise is captured by the number of financial
experts serving on the committee. There is a
significant, positive relationship between board
diligence, board expertise, and audit committee
financial expertise and audit fees. However, unlike
prior research findings, in which audit committee
variables were not significant in the presence of
board variables (Carcello, 2002), this study notes a
significant, positive relationship between the number
of audit committee financial experts and audit fees.
This outcome is important because it indicates the
growing impact of financial experts on the cost of
audits. In addition, it is noteworthy that when audit
committee meeting frequency rather than board
meeting frequency is utilized as a measure of
diligence, it is not statistically significant. This
outcome differs from previous findings (Abbott,
2003), and suggests the increasing role of the board
and the positive association between its meeting
frequency and audit fees.
PRIOR RESEARCH STUDIES AND
BACKGROUND
Several research papers document the
observed relationship between audit fees and
measures
of
corporate
governance.
The
characteristics of the board of directors can influence
audit costs because in executing its monitoring duties
the board seeks “to protect its reputational capital, to
avoid legal liability and to promote shareholder
interest by purchasing differentially higher audit
quality” (Carcello, 2002). In addition, the auditor
may provide higher quality assurance services if it is
understood that the board (i.e. the client) is
“particularly high quality and demanding”. (Carcello,
2002). In their study Board Characteristics and
Audit Fees, Carcello et al examined the relationship
between audit fees and measures of board
independence (percentage of outside directors on the
board), board diligence (number of board meetings)
and board expertise (average number of other director
positions held by non-management directors). Using
sample data for fiscal years ending between April
1992 and March 1993 for “Big 6”- audited Fortune
1000 companies, all three board measures were found

to have a significant, positive relationship with audit
fees.
Further, the study examined separately the
impact of comparable variables for the audit
committee on audit fees, given its critical role of
interacting directly with the external auditor. Audit
committee independence and expertise both had a
significant, positive relation with audit fees, but audit
committee diligence (i.e. number of meetings) was
not significant. Interestingly, when the three
measures of independence, diligence and expertise
for both the board and the audit committee were
included in their regression model, all three board
measures persisted in having significant, positive
association with audit fees but none of the audit
committee variables were significant.
In The Association between Audit
Committee Characteristics and Audit Fees,
researchers noted that “audit committees seeking a
higher level of audit assurance could demand a
greater level of audit coverage resulting in higher
audit fees” (Abbott, 2003). They tested the relation
between audit fees and attributes of the audit
committee using more recent 2001 sample data of
“Big 5”- audited companies. Both audit committee
independence (composed entirely of outside,
independent directors) and audit committee financial
expertise (at least one member with financial
expertise) had significant, positive associations with
audit fees, while audit meeting frequency (meeting at
least four times annually) was not significant.
(Abbott, 2003) These results were different from
those of Carcello et al, because these audit committee
quality measures were significant in conjunction with
board variables included as control variables. Board
meeting frequency and board independence were also
statistically significant in positively affecting audit
fees, although board expertise was not. Thus, the
findings of Abbott et al expanded those of Carcello,
suggesting that audit committee attributes can also
have an impact on audit costs.
These studies contributed to the examination
of corporate governance measures and their influence
on audit fees in a pre-SOX environment. However,
the impact of SOX on the role and functions of both
the board and the audit committee in the 21st century
renders the results of these studies outdated.
Empirical studies prior to SOX focused on the
relationship between audit fees and audit committee
characteristics (independence of committee members
and financial expertise of committee members) that
were recommended as “best practices” but were not
required. These recommendations stemmed largely

from the report of the Blue Ribbon Committee on
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit
Committees, sponsored by the New York Stock
Exchange and the National Association of Securities
Dealers. Since SOX, many of these recommendations
have been legislated, and public companies have
reacted to the need to “restructure the board of
directors and the audit committee to effectively
undertake the new responsibilities assigned by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act” (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
Evolution of Corporate governance, CPA Journal,
March 2004).
Several significant changes legislated by
SOX and the SEC affect corporate governance. The
first relates to independence: there are more stringent
standards for defining independence and it is now
mandated that all audit committee members be
independent and a majority (2/3) of the board of
directors must be independent. In addition, the audit
committee also must have not only members who are
all “financially literate” but also at least one member
who is a “financial expert”, and the criteria for
satisfying that role is more clearly delineated. Finally,
both the board and the audit committee are much
more empowered entities than they were previously.
The authority and responsibilities of the audit
committee have been augmented. Among other
things, the audit committee now determines the
appointment of and compensation for the company’s
independent auditors (previously administered by the
board), and also must pre-approve all audit and nonaudit services provided by the independent auditors.
As well, the board is now required to establish and
disclose its corporate governance guidelines; it must
also establish a nominating/corporate governance
committee and a compensation committee, in each
case composed entirely of independent directors.
Further, the chief executive officer is required to
certify annually that he or she is not aware of any
violation by the company of the NYSE’s corporate
governance listing standards.
HYPOTHESES
The monitoring of the financial reporting
process is of critical importance in the post-SOX time
period, in which board members and their audit
committees are being held to increased standards of
performance. Given these conditions, it is fitting to
examine the connection between audit fees and
corporate governance characteristics in the context of
this new reporting and disclosure environment. Four
hypotheses are set forth below related to audit fees
and the attributes of the board and its audit
committee.

Board of Directors Expertise
Directors have a fiduciary responsibility to
exercise care in monitoring management and to act
judiciously in establishing and carrying out corporate
strategy to maximize shareholder wealth. Directors
who are involved in a greater number of boards are
likely to possess an increased level of expertise in
achieving these goals. Furthermore, through service
on multiple boards, they have invested significant
time and effort into developing reputational capital,
and will seek to sustain their professional standing.
More experienced directors want to avoid legal
liability and do not want to be associated with
corporate failures or fraud, and therefore will support
the purchase of higher than normal audit services to
insure appropriate financial reporting and disclosure.
Board expertise is measured by the average
number of additional directorships held by the
directors of the board. Firms with stronger corporate
governance through greater board expertise will seek
higher quality financial reporting, which leads to
higher audit fees and this hypothesis:
H1: There is a positive association between
audit fees and board of directors’ expertise
Board of Directors Diligence
Meeting frequency is an indication of and a
proxy for board of directors’ conscientiousness. A
board that meets more frequently can increase the
effectiveness of its oversight role by being more
aware and knowledgeable of important corporate,
strategic and financial reporting issues and concerns.
SOX has added to the board’s plate the need to
address SOX compliance issues, such that directors
find “they are spending so much time with the audit
committee and issues related to legal and ethical
considerations” (Eckbo). As a result, boards that
meet more often can interact with the audit
committee, and thus may influence audit activity and
coverage during various stages of the audit, leading
to this hypothesis:
H2: There is a positive association between
audit fees and board of directors’ meeting
frequency
Audit Committee Financial Expert
The audit committee is a subgroup of the
corporation’s board of directors. Under SOX, the
audit committee selects the independent audit firm
for ratification by the stockholders, sets the external
auditor’s fees, and reviews the scope of the auditor’s

services. All audit committee members of publicly
held firms are required to possess financial literacy,
and must now include at least one financial expert.
An "audit committee financial expert" possesses the
appropriate educational background, prior experience
as a chief financial officer and/or chief executive
officer, understanding of generally accepted
accounting principles and financial statements, and
may also have membership on various audit
committees. Audit committee members who are
financial experts “provide additional support for the
external auditors when discussing or negotiating
auditing issues and/or audit scope with management.
Such expertise allows audit committee members to
better understand the auditing issues, risks, and the
audit procedures proposed to address these issues and
risks.” (Abbott, 2003) Thus, an audit committee with
more financial experts can enhance the competence
of the committee and the quality of its role in the
financial reporting process. In turn, an audit
committee with more financial experts will affect its
execution of responsibilities to seek a higher quality
audit from its auditors, which leads to higher audit
fees, leading to this hypothesis:
H3: There is a positive association between
audit fees and the number of audit
committee financial experts
Audit Committee Diligence
Meeting frequency is an indication of and a
proxy for audit committee diligence. A committee
that meets more frequently will be more aware and
knowledgeable of significant accounting, reporting
and auditing concerns. With the passage of SOX,
“the workload is more detailed, demanding and
increasingly somber” such that “audit committee
members must be willing to attend more frequent and
longer meetings.” (Sweeney, 2002) Thus, audit
committees that have more meetings per year can
influence audit activity and coverage during various
stages of the audit, leading to this hypothesis:
H4: There is a positive association between
audit fees and audit committee meeting
frequency
REGRESSION MODELS
Two empirical models are used to test the
hypotheses. The first model tests the association
LNAF05 =
between audit fees and board of directors’ diligence,
board of directors’ diligence, and audit committee
financial experts.

MODEL 1:
LNAF05 =β0 + β1 BODMTG + β2 AVGOSDIR +
β3FINEX + β4ARPERC + β5INVPERC +
β6LEVERAGE + β7SUBSID – β8SUBSID2 + β9TA –
β10TA2
The dependent and independent variables are defined
as follows:
LNAF05: Consistent with many previous
studies on audit fees, the dependent variable is the
natural log of 2005 audit fees (expressed in millions
of dollars).
BODMTG: Board of directors’ diligence is
measured as the number of meetings of the board
held during the year as disclosed in the proxy
statement.
AVGOSDIR: Board of directors’ expertise is
measured as the average number of outside
directorships held by directors.
FINEX: Audit Committee expertise is
measured as the number of financial experts who
serve on the committee.
In addition to these test variables, a variety
of control measures are used that have been found in
prior literature to typically have a positive effect on
audit fees. These control variables include: (1) the
complexity of the audit, as measured by several
factors: the proportion of total accounts receivable
relative to total assets (ARPERC), the proportion of
total inventory relative to total assets (INVPERC) and
the number of subsidiaries (SUBSID); (2) the size of
the client, as measured by total assets (TA); and (3)
the risk of the client, as measured by total debt
divided by total assets (LEVERAGE). The SUBSID
and TA variables are also squared (SUBSID2 and
TA2), given the expectation that audit fees will
increase with the number of subsidiaries and total
assets, respectively, but at a decreasing rate.
The second empirical model includes the
same measures of board and audit committee
expertise, but substitutes audit committee diligence
(AUDMTG) for board of director diligence to test its
association with audit fees. AUDMTG is measured as
the number of meetings of the audit committee held
during the year as disclosed in the proxy statement.
MODEL 2:
LNAF05 =β0 + β1 AUDMTG + β2AVGOSDIR +
β3FINEX + β4ARPERC + β5INVPERC +
β6LEVERAGE + β7SUBSID – β8SUBSID2 + β9TA –
β10TA2

SAMPLE SELECTION
A random sample of 100 companies was
selected from the Fortune 500 listing for the year
2005. Fortune magazine compiles and publishes the
list annually, which is a ranking of the top 500 United
States public corporations as measured by gross
revenue, although eligible companies are any for
which revenues are publicly available. Only firms
which were audited by the Big Four were included in
the sample since prior research indicates that services
provided by large audit firms have different price
structures; that is, clients who engage larger firms
tend to pay higher fees than those which obtain audit
services from regional auditing firms. A distribution
of the sample, by industry, is presented in Table 1,
and reflects that nearly half of the companies in the
sample operate in the manufacturing sector.

number of outside directorships held by board
members (AVGDIROS).
REGRESSION RESULTS
Table 4 summarizes the results from three
audit fee regressions. The Control Model regresses
LNAF05 on only the seven control variables included
in the empirical models. Model 1 regresses LNAF05
on the control variables and the three test variables
related to board meeting frequency, board of director
expertise, audit committee financial experts
(BODMTG, AVGDIROS, and FINEX). Model 2
regresses LNAF05 on the same variables as Model 1
except it substitutes audit committee meeting
frequency (AUDMTG) for board meeting frequency
(BODMTG).

Descriptive statistics of the variables used in
the regression models are presented in Table 2. The
average 2005 audit fee for the sample companies was
$8.02 million. The average decline in audit fees from
2004 was 8% with 68% of firms in the sample
experiencing a decline in audit fees while 38%
experienced an audit fee increase (not reported in
Table 2).
The average number of outside
directorships held by board members was 1.98
(minimum of .14 and maximum of 5.22) while the
average number of financial experts was 2.24
(minimum of 1 and maximum of 6). Board of
director meetings averaged 8.56 (minimum of 4 and
maximum of 26) while the average number of audit
committee meetings was 9.47 (minimum of 4 and
maximum of 22).

The Control Model, which regresses
LNAF05 on control variables reflects an adjusted R2
of .497. All of the control variables are significantly
associated with audit fees in the predicted direction,
with two exceptions. LEVERAGE is positively related
as expected, but not statistically significant. This
result is likely because the firms comprising this
sample, despite their varying degrees of debt, are
large, stable corporations; in addition, the
incremental costs of auditing contractual debt
obligations is not dramatically affected by the
magnitude of the debt. In contrast, INVPERC is
negatively associated with audit fees and statistically
significant. This outcome is contrary to expectations
and cannot readily be explained. This peculiar result
differs from that noted in prior studies cited in this
paper, in which a comparable variable was either
statistically insignificant or had a positive, significant
association with audit fees.

A correlation matrix of the dependent and
independent variables is presented in Table 3. Three
of the test variables are correlated with the natural log
of 2005 audit fees (LNAF05) with the average
number of outside directorships held by board
members (AVGDIROS) exhibiting the largest
correlation at .40 (p-value <.0001). Among the
control variables, total assets (TA) and number of
subsidiaries (SUBSID) reflect the largest correlation
with LNAF05 at .52 (p-value <.0001) and .25 (pvalue <.0108), respectively. Inventory as a
percentage of total assets (INVPERC) indicates a
surprising correlation with LNAF05 of -.49. Among
the explanatory variables, the two largest correlations
are (1) .34 (p-value <.0005) between the number of
audit meetings (AUDMTG) and number of board of
director meetings (BODMTG) and (2) .32 (p-value
<.001) between total assets (TA) and the average

Model 1, which regresses LNAF05 on the
control variables and the three test variables related
to board of director meeting frequency (BODMTG),
board of director expertise (AVGOSDIR) and audit
committee financial experts (FINEX) has an adjusted
R2 of .53. All three attributes reflect a significant,
positive association with audit fees, thereby
providing support for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. In
terms of the degree of impact these explanatory
variables have on audit fees, holding one additional
board meeting results in a 3% increase in audit fees,
while increasing average outside directorships by one
results in a 14% increase in audit fees. Using the
average audit fees for 2005 of $8.02 million, these
effects are equivalent to a $240,000 and $1.04
million increase, respectively, in audit fees. The
presence of one additional financial expert on the
audit committee raises audit fees by 8 percent,

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

equivalent to a $642,000 increase. Thus, these effects
are of consequence. The coefficients and significance
for the control variables are consistent with those
indicated in the Control Model.
Model 2 regresses LNAF05 on the same
variables as Model 1, but substitutes audit committee
meeting frequency (AUDMTG) for board of director
meeting frequency (BODMTG) as the measure of
diligence. This regression results in an adjusted R2 of
.52, negligibly lower than Model 1. Both variables
measuring expertise (AVGDIROS and FINEX) reflect
a positive, significant association with audit fees;
their coefficients are consistent with those in Model 1
as are the observed results for the control variables.
However, although audit meeting frequency
(AUDMTG) has the expected positive relationship
with audit fees, it is not statistically significant.
Model 2 thus supports Hypotheses 1 and 3, but not
Hypothesis 4. Substitution of audit committee
meeting frequency for board meeting frequency in
Model 2 sheds an interesting light on the greater
relative impact of the board as a whole versus the
audit committee on audit fees.
CONCLUSION
This study is an initial effort to examine the
relationship between various board and audit
committee characteristics and audit fees in the postSOX corporate reporting environment. Although
there is a limited amount of literature which focuses
on the relationship between audit fees and corporate
governance prior to the implementation of SOX, it
was chiefly focused on only board of directors’
characteristics. This empirical study examines the

impact of both board and audit committee factors on
audit fees, using more current audit fee data and
reporting disclosures, which reflect the impact of the
SOX requirements and SEC regulations of the early
21st century.
The results support the theory that higher
quality corporate governance as measured by board
diligence and expertise as well as audit committee
financial expertise is associated with higher audit
costs. Consistent with prior studies, it reflects audit
committee meeting frequency is not associated with
audit fees. Of particular note, the results differ from
pre-SOX studies because they reveal the influence of
both financial experts and board expertise on audit
fees, when both board and audit committee variables
are included in the empirical model. This signifies a
shift toward the increasing influence of experts on
external audit costs in the post-SOX environment.
This paper is subject to a number of
limitations. First, the sample represents only very
large public companies so the results may not apply
to corporations of smaller sizes. Second, there may
be other corporate governance factors not captured in
this study which correlate with audit fees. However,
the analysis uses more recent financial information,
examines audit fees after the implementation of SOX,
and finds a concurrent link between audit fees and
board and audit committee variables (board diligence,
board expertise, and audit committee expertise).
Thus, this study adds to the growing body of
literature that finds a connection between several
facets of corporate governance and the fees paid for
financial reporting and auditing.
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TABLE 1
Sample Industry Distribution (n=100)
SIC Code
1000-1999
2000-2999
3000-3999
4000-4999
5000-5999
6000-6999
7000-9999
Total

Number of
Observations
5
26
23
17
17
5
7
100

Industry
Mining, Construction
Manufacturing-Food, textiles, lumber, chemicals
Manufacturing-Rubber, metal, machinery, equipment
Transportation, Communication, Utilities
Wholesale, Retail
Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate
Services

TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics (n=100)
Variable
Mean
AF05
8.02

Standard Deviation
6.67

Minimum
0.89

Maximum
33.77

lnAF05

1.74

0.87

-0.12

3.52

arperc

12.42

10.65

0.00

61.23

invperc

13.65

17.65

0.00

80.38

leverage

59.54

19.53

15.61

125.07

Subsid

167.02

238.70

1.00

1,469.00

TA

25,656.00

36,404.00

1,313.00

208,335.00

FinEx

2.24

1.44

1.00

6.00

AudMtg

9.47

3.77

4.00

22.00

AvgDirOS

1.98

0.95

0.14

5.22

BODMtg

8.56

3.62

4.00

26.00

Notes:
AF05

2005 audit fee in millions of dollars

lnAF05

natural log of 2005 audit fee in millions of dollars

arperc

total accounts receivable as a percentage of total assets

invperc

total inventory as a percentage of total assets

leverage

total debt as a percentage of total assets

Subsid

number of subsidiaries

TA

total assets in millions of dollars

FinEx

number of financial experts

AudMtg

number of audit committee meetings

AvgDirOS

average number of outside directorships held by directors

BODMtg

number of board of director meetings

TABLE 3
CORRELATION MATRIX (n=100)
(p-values in italics)

lnAF05

arperc
invperc
leverage
Subsid
TA
FinEx
AudMtg
AvgDirOS

arperc

invper
c

leverag
e

Subsid

0.11

-0.49

0.08

0.25

0.288

<.0001

0.4326

-0.11
0.2781

TA

FinEx

AudMt
g

AvgDirO
S

BODMt
g

0.19

0.10

0.40

0.20

0.0108

0.52
<.000
1

0.0586

0.3416

<.0001

0.0432

0.08
0.4221

0.05
0.6207

-0.24
0.018

-0.01
0.9142

0.02
0.8685

-0.03
0.8002

-0.10
0.3179

-0.10
0.3413

-0.10
0.3346

-0.28
0.0043

-0.07
0.4929

-0.10
0.3381

-0.28
0.0046

-0.19
0.0543

0.07
0.4825

0.01
0.9581

-0.06
0.575

0.08
0.4395

0.08
0.4163

0.14
0.1672

0.19
0.0575

-0.02
0.8264

-0.07
0.4702

0.12
0.2183

-0.01
0.8871

0.16
0.1107

0.04
0.6881

0.32
0.001

0.18
0.0814

-0.02
0.8362

-0.05
0.6448

0.02
0.8254

-0.17
0.0845

0.34
0.0005
0.00
0.9728

TABLE 4
*significant at 5%

Audit Fee regression results (n=100)
(Dependent variable = LNAF05)

Variable

Intercept

**significant at 10%

Control Model:
tCoefficient statistic p-value

0.91187

3.43

0.0009

Model 1:
tCoefficient statistic

*

0.20745

0.61

Model 2:
tCoefficient statistic

p-value

0.5450

AudMtg

p-value

0.28984

0.82

0.4143

0.01955

1.16

0.2473

BODMtg

0.03181

1.82

0.0724

**

FinEx

0.08460

1.98

0.0510

*

0.08592

1.98

0.0503

*

AvgDirOS

0.14389

2.00

0.0481

*

0.15310

2.06

0.0421

*

Arperc

0.02030

3.17

0.0021

*

0.02086

3.35

0.0012

*

0.01927

3.08

0.0027

*

Invperc

-0.01342

-3.44

0.0009

*

-0.01074

-2.77

0.0067

*

-0.01155

-2.98

0.0037

*

leverage

0.00168

0.52

0.6064

0.00091

0.29

0.7748

0.00136

0.43

0.6698

Subsid

0.00145

2.14

0.0352

*

0.00159

2.42

0.0175

*

0.00153

2.31

0.0231

*

Subsid2

0.00000

-1.94

0.0556

*

-0.000001

-2.18

0.0317

*

0.00000

-2.04

0.0440

*

TA

0.00003

5.26

<.0001

*

0.000026

4.77

<.0001

*

0.00003

4.56

<.0001

*

TA2

0.00000

-3.57

0.0006

*

0.000000

-3.51

0.0007

*

0.00000

-3.27

0.0015

*

NOTE: Diagnostics on these regressions revealed that multicollinearity is not a problem.

